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CAPPING THE GOVERNMENT'S NEEDLE:
THE NEED TO PROTECT PAROLEES'
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY INTERESTS
FROM SUSPICIONLESS DNA SEARCHES IN
UNITED STA TES V. KINCADE
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine being suspected and arrested for any felony offense,
which may have resulted from mistaken identity or a traffic stop.'
You may be one of the 50,000 people arrested in California every
year, but never charged with a crime.2 As a result of Proposition 69,
which recently passed in California, law enforcement will be autho-
rized to collect your DNA and file it in a criminal database.3 DNA is
the unique genetic material that contains a person's most intimate
information, ranging from physical characteristics to disease dispo-
sition.4 Upon merely being arrested, you would relinquish posse-
ssory rights to your own DNA, which can only be removed from the
criminal database through a difficult and burdensome process.5 The
1. PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, WHY THE PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE OPPOSES CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 69: "DNA SAMPLES.
COLLECTION. DATABASE. FUNDING. INITIATIVE STATUTE," http://www.
privacyrights.org/ar/Prop69.htm (updated Nov. 5, 2004). The provision calling
for DNA collection of "[aldults arrested for or charged with any felony
offense" begins in 2009. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See John P. Cronan, The Next Frontier of Law Enforcement: A
Proposal for Complete DNA Databanks, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119, 124-25
(2000).
5. See PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 1. In order to have
the DNA information removed from the database, an individual must send a
formal request to the trial court of the county in which he/she was arrested,
send a formal request to the DNA Laboratory of the California Department of
Justice, and send a formal request to the prosecuting attorney of the county in
which he/she was arrested, convicted, or adjudicated, with proof of service on
all parties. Id. A court may even deny this request and it is not appealable. Id.
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California legislative enactment illustrates the expansion of
government DNA profiling.
In United States v. Kincade,6 a divided Ninth Circuit court
upheld the constitutionality of the DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 2000 ("DNA Act" or "Act"). 7 The Act requires,
in part, that persons on supervised release provide blood samples for
DNA profiling.8 Although the use of DNA in the criminal justice
context has been limited to identification purposes,9 there is a fear
that future governments may use such information to "monitor,
intimidate, and incarcerate political opponents and disfavored
minorities." 10 Nevertheless, the court in Kincade succumbed to the
pressures of strengthening the hand of law enforcement, collapsing
the structural protections of individual privacy rights. In effect, the
court widened the path to allow over-reaching measures, such as
Proposition 69, to threaten our interests in our DNA.
Thomas Kincade, a parolee, challenged the constitutionality of
the Act alleging that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights
because it required collecting his DNA without any reasonable
suspicion he committed another crime." The United States District
Court for the Central District of California denied Kincade's claim.
12
Then, a Ninth Circuit panel found that the DNA Act did in fact
violate Kincade's Fourth Amendment rights protecting him from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 13 Taking the case en banc, the
Ninth Circuit reviewed the federal statute's constitutionality de
novo.14 The en banc plurality affirmed the district court's decision,
6. 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
7. Id. at 839.
8. Id. at 816-17, 839.
9. See generally Virna M. Manuel, State DNA Data Base and Data Bank
Expansion Laws: Is it Time for California to Expand its DNA Data Base Law
to Include All Convicted Felons?, 31 W. ST. U. L. REV. 339 (2004) (discussing
how "[a]ll fifty states have enacted a criminal DNA Data Base and Data Bank
statute to provide for the collection and retention of DNA samples" and
arguing for the expanse of DNA laws to require DNA samples from all felons
and certain arrestees). Id. at 340.
10. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 848 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
11. Seeid. at 821.
12. Id.
13. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'den
banc, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
14. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 821 n.14.
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finding the DNA Act did not rise to the level of an unconstitutional
violation of Kincade's Fourth Amendment rights.' 5 This decision
realigned the Ninth Circuit with its sister circuits and other U.S.
district courts, which have upheld the constitutionality of the federal
DNA Act and state statutes passed pursuant to it.
16
As both national and local law enforcement agencies and state
legislatures seek the aggressive expansion of DNA databases, the
constitutionality of these searches and seizures remains hotly
contested. 17 As of December 2004, the National DNA Index System
contained over 2 million convicted offender DNA profiles in its
database. Proponents of DNA profiling herald the revolutionary
impact DNA technology has had on criminal investigations and its
compelling ability to exonerate wrongfully convicted criminals.'
9
Opponents, on the other hand, challenge such profiling on privacy
and ethical concerns.
20
This Comment will discuss how the Ninth Circuit, in validating
a suspicionless search regime with an inappropriate test, eroded the
structural protections offered by the Fourth Amendment. Part II
provides a factual background and the procedural posture of the case.
Part III introduces the DNA Act and the federally maintained DNA
database, CODIS, and discusses its purpose. Part IV examines
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, beginning with the probable cause
and warrant requirements and continuing to the judicially created
15. Id. at 840.
16. See, e.g., Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 2003); Roe v. Marcotte,
193 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999); Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708, at *18-*19 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2004).
17. See generally Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His
Science Kit: DNA Databases for 21st Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 635 (2000) (discussing various possible scenarios ranging
from having no DNA databases at all to total population inclusion, while
questioning the effectiveness of DNA collection where a majority of FBI Index
crimes do not have a high potential benefit from DNA testing).
18. CODIS National DNA Index System, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/
codis/national.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
19. See Cronan, supra note 4, at 130-31.
20. See, e.g., Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey
of Trends in Criminal DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 214-16
(2000) (identifying "several areas where criminal offender DNA databanking
statutes may inadequately protect persons' rights to privacy, bodily integrity,
and presumptive innocence." Id. at 209.).
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"special needs" exception. This section also explores the application
of a totality of the circumstances analysis in approving searches short
of probable cause. Part V presents the Kincade analysis under a
totality of the circumstances approach. Part VI discusses not only
why the plurality applied the wrong test, but also how it applied it
improperly. This section asserts that the special needs doctrine was
the appropriate test. Part VII further explores the implications of the
court's test and the concerns of unconstitutional DNA profiling.
Finally, this Comment concludes that a suspicionless search cannot
survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny using an unprincipled totality of
the circumstances test. Doing so only serves to lengthen the reach of
law enforcement into the confines of privacy interests.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
After pleading guilty to his involvement in a July 20, 1993
armed bank robbery, 21 Thomas Kincade received a ninety-seven-
month sentence by the district court, followed by three years of
supervised release. 2 He was released from prison on August 4,
2000, and during the next year and a half, Kincade encountered
problems with drug abuse.23  On March 25, 2002, Kincade's
probation officer ordered him to submit a blood sample pursuant to
the DNA Act.24 Because of the nature of his crime, Kincade was
lawfully subjected to the Act.25 He refused to comply with the order
as a matter of personal preference. 26  This refusal constituted an
independent misdemeanor violation under the DNA Act.27 At his
21. Kincade was in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a),(d) and 924(c)(1).
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 820 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
22. Id. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit court recognized no constitutional
difference between Kincade's status as a supervised, releasee and that of a
parolee or probationer. See id. at 817 n.2. Thus, these terms are used inter-
changeably.
23. See id. at 820.
24. Id.
25. Under the DNA Act, the probation office shall collect a DNA sample
from an individual, on supervised release, parole, or probation, who was con-
victed of a qualifying federal offense. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2) (2000). Any
felony offense involving robbery or burglary is a qualifying offense. Id.
§ 14135a(d)(1)(E).
26. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 820.
27. See § 14135a(a)(5)(A), (B) (stipulating that the criminal penalty for
failure to cooperate with sample collection results in a class A misdemeanor
2350
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district court hearing, Kincade challenged the constitutionality of the
Act on various grounds, including the Fourth Amendment.
28
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California rejected Kincade's Fourth Amendment challenge of the
DNA Act, finding that his refusal to submit to the probation officer's
order for a blood extraction was a violation of the terms of his
supervised release. 29  Consequently, the district court judge
sentenced him to a four-month custody sentence followed by an
additional two years of supervised release.30 The court, however,
stayed the sentence and expedited the case to the Ninth Circuit for
appeal.3' In April 2003, while the appeal was still pending, Kincade
continued to serve his supervised release and abuse drugs. 32 As a
result of a positive test for drug use, the district court lifted the stay,
and finally forced Kincade to provide a blood sample while in
custody. 33  The extraction occurred during Kincade's four-month
custody sentence. He was only in custody, however, because he
originally refused to submit to DNA profiling while on supervised
release. 34 Therefore, Kincade's constitutional challenge to the Act
implicated the Fourth Amendment as it applied to him as a parolee
rather than as a person in custody.
Kincade's appeal went before a Ninth Circuit panel. On
October 2, 2003 the court held that forced blood extractions from
parolees requires individualized suspicion, and therefore the DNA
Act was unconstitutional.35 On January 5, 2004, a Ninth Circuit en
banc hearing was granted.36 On August 18, 2004, the en banc court
punishable under Title 18).
28. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 821 (stating that among Kincade's other
constitutional challenges were claims that the DNA Act violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause, separation of powers principles embodied in Article III, and the
Due Process Clause).
29. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en
banc, 379 F.3d. 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1098-99.
32. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 821.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 820.
35. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en
banc, 379 F.3d. 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
36. United States v. Kincade, No. 02-50380, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 89, at
*1-*2 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2004).
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held suspicionless DNA searches of parolees authorized by the DNA
Act were reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
37
III. THE DNA ACT AND CODIS
A. The DNA Act
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994.38 This Act only authorized the collection
of DNA samples from convicted offenders, crime scenes,
unidentified human remains, and samples voluntarily contributed
from relatives of missing persons. 39 This prompted Congress to
consider a bill explicitly conferring upon federal law enforcement the
authority to collect DNA samples not only from convicted federal
offenders in custody, but also from individuals on supervised release,
parole, or probation. 40 Subsequently, the provisions allowing DNA
extraction from both prisoners and parolees were embodied in the
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000,41 which now serves
as the statutory basis for forced extraction of blood samples.
42
In authorizing the extraction of blood, the DNA Act does not
require suspicion that an individual on supervised release, parole, or
probation will commit or has committed another crime.
4 3
Additionally, the DNA Act authorizes a probation officer to collect a
DNA sample without requiring that such sample be used in the
investigation of a particular offense.44 Moreover, it should be noted
the DNA analysis constitutes identifying "junk DNA," which are
stretches of DNA that do not encode information for the expression
of traits.45 These sites, however, are sufficient to create highly
individualized DNA profiles and have the potential to reveal more
37. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839-40.
38. Violent Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1797 (1994)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2000).
40. 146 CONG. REc. H8572, H8573 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000) (enacted).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (Supp. 2000).
42. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en
banc, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
43. See id.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a).
45. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc).
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genetically relevant information than purported.
46
B. CODIS: The Federally Maintained DNA Database
The Combined DNA Information System ("CODIS") serves as
the national criminal database administered by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).4 7 Created in 1990, CODIS received formalized
authority in 1994 to use the DNA samples collected pursuant to the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.4 8 Presently, the
database encompasses the DNA samples authorized by the DNA
Identification Act.49 All 50 states enacted statutes creating DNA
databases.50 Data sharing between local, state, and national DNA
profiles relies on a three-tiered structure.5 1 This structure allows the
local and state agencies to operate at an individualized level
according to their needs. 52 Forty-nine of the states, along with the
U.S. Army and Puerto Rico, share DNA profiles through CODIS.
53
Federal and local law enforcement use CODIS to match forensic
crime scene samples to another crime scene sample and to match
crime scene evidence to a particular offender's DNA 
profile. 54
The arguments in favor of expanding the database rest on funda-
mental law enforcement objectives of matching crime scene evidence
to a potential offender in the DNA database. Congressional records
indicate the program has been vital to crime prevention and fighting
efforts.5 5 Offenses listed in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 have greatly expanded
the number of qualifying federal crimes beyond those originally
approved by the DNA Act.
56
46. See id. at 849-50 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
47. See CODIS-Mission Statement and Background, at http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/codis/program.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
48. See Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1097.
49. See CODIS-Mission Statement and Background, supra note 47, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/program.htm.
50. Kincade, 345 F.3d at1097.
51. CODIS-Mission Statement and Background, supra note 47, at http://
www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/program.htm.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 819 n.9 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc).
54. Id. at 819.
55. See 146 CONG. REC. H12032 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2000) (statement of
Rep. Gilman).
56. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 846 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (pointing out
the majority's failure to accurately portray the broad reach of the DNA Act).
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This trend of expansion continues. Passed on November 2,
2004, Proposition 69, endorsed by California Governor
Schwarzenegger, requires the collection of DNA samples from
persons convicted of any felony offense and any person arrested for,
charged with, or who attempt to commit felony sex and homicide
offenses. 7  Moreover, the Department of Justice and President
George W. Bush's DNA initiative proposes to commit more than one
billion dollars over five years to implement a more efficient and
expansive use of DNA technology in the criminal justice system.58
Not only does this initiative intend to aid in testing backlogged DNA
samples, it would allow states like California to continue aggressive
inclusion of DNA profiles from arrestees and juvenile offenders.59
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and establishes a
probable cause and warrant requirement for such activities.6 0 In
order for a search to be conducted, an individual must have a
subjective reasonable expectation of privacy that "society is prepared
to accept as reasonable."61  The Fourth Amendment protects
individuals against unreasonable government intrusion into this
In a seemingly endless paragraph, the dissent provided a "sample" and "non-
exhaustive" laundry list of federal crimes under 28 C.F.R § 28.2 that expands
the number of qualifying offenses under the DNA Act. Id. at 846-48
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The dissent found such crimes are susceptible to"countless possible permutations of qualifying crimes." Id. at 846 (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting).
57. See Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger Endorses Prop. 69, The DNA
Fingerprint Initiative, PR NEWSWiRE, July 7, 2004 (emphasis added) (on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review), http://www.prnewswire.com/
cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT= 109&story=/www/story/07-07-2004/0002206346&
EDATE=.
58. See Liza Porteus, Supporters, Critics Debate DNA Database
Expansion, Fox NEWS, May 9, 2003, available at http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,86390,00.html.
59. Id.
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause.... ."); see also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 851 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
61. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
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privacy expectation: 62
i[When the State's reason to believe incriminating
evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the
invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to
search and seize will issue .. " [I]n applying the "probable
cause" standard "by which a particular decision to search is
tested against the constitutional mandate of reason-
ableness," it is necessary "to focus upon the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion."
63
In certain circumstances, however, the United States Supreme
Court departed from the probable cause standard and allowed law
enforcement to conduct searches based solely on reasonable
suspicion. For example, the Court has applied a less demanding
reasonable suspicion standard in cases where circumstances
necessitated quick police action, making the warrant procedure
impractical." Courts adduce the reasonableness of a warrantless
search by evaluating the totality of the circumstances and by speci-
fically identifying facts supporting the intrusion.65  A broad
categorical exception to the probable cause requirement is "exempted
areas,"66 which include airport and border searches, where the Court
requires a minimum level of reasonableness to justify a lawful search
and seizure.6 7 Similarly, the Court views the confines of prison walls
to be an exempted area,68 emphasizing the loss of privacy interests of
individuals in custody.
62. See id.
63. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554-555 (1978) (citations
omitted).
64. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 30 (1968) (allowing a "stop and
frisk" warrantless search where the officer reasonably suspected the person
was armed).
65. See id. at 21.
66. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
67. Id.; see also United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)
(maintaining that the sovereign has a right to protect its borders, and the
reasonableness of searches among border crossings is by virtue of that fact);
United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1974) (justifying
warrantless airport searches on the basis that where there is a risk of
endangering hundreds, which may result from explosives at a government
building or the hijacking of an aircraft, the danger alone satisfies the test of
reasonableness).
68. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-29 (1984) (concluding that
prisoners do not have expectations of privacy within their prison cells).
December 2005] 2355
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A. The Special Needs Doctrine:
An Exception to the Probable Cause Requirement
The Supreme Court decided a line of cases delineating another
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement, conferring
government authority to conduct searches when a special need makes
the warrant requirement impracticable. 69 The special needs doctrine
balances government interests against individual privacy.70 Where
the Court deemed such intrusions minimal compared to the govern-
ment interest at stake, the Court carved out exceptions for searches
lacking probable cause, and in some cases, without individualized,
reasonable suspicion.71 The Court has applied the special needs
exception to uphold workplace searches 72 and random drug testing of
student athletes73 and U.S. Customs officials.
74
In Griffin v. Wisconsin,75 the U.S. Supreme Court found that the
state's probation system falls within the special needs exception.
76
This permitted the state a degree of impingement upon privacy where
"reasonable grounds" existed.77 The Court held that in furthering the
goals of probation-a period of parolee rehabilitation that also serves
to insure community safety-a standard of reasonable grounds would
replace the probable cause requirement where obtaining a warrant
would be impracticable.
78
B. Establishing a New Rule that
Curtails the Special Needs Exception
The Supreme Court greatly curtailed the reach of the special
needs doctrine in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond79 and Ferguson v.
69. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
70. See Joseph S. Dowdy, Well Isn't That Special? The Supreme Court's
Immediate Purpose of Restricting the Doctrine of Special Needs in Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1050, 1054-58 (2002) (suggesting that the
doctrine has been limited over time).
71. See id. at 1054-56.
72. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
73. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
74. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
75. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
76. Id. at 873-74.
77. See id. at 875.
78. See id. at 872-73.
79. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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City of Charleston."° In Edmond, the Court was unwilling to justify
a regime of suspicionless stops under the ambit of "general interest
in crime control" where roadblocks set up by law enforcement
primarily served to interdict narcotics.8' In Ferguson, the Court held
that a state hospital's screening program implemented to detect the
presence of cocaine in pregnant women primarily for the purpose of
supplying the results to law enforcement unconstitutionally intruded
on the patients' reasonable expectations of privacy.82  Concerned
with the primary purpose of the program and the extensive
involvement of police in the administration of the policy, the Court
held the searches did not fall within the special needs exception.
8 3
Finding that the special needs category is a closely guarded one,
the Court in both Edmond and Ferguson added a new requirement to
the special needs analysis: the immediate objective inquiry.8 4 Thus,
where the Court determines that the immediate objective of a
suspicionless search is a general law enforcement end, it will not
recognize a special need justifying the search.8 5
C. Totality of the Circumstances
Courts have also employed a traditional totality of the
circumstances approach to determine the lawfulness of searches
where only a level of reasonable suspicion is present.8 6 Under this
approach, the Court does not address the question of whether there is
a "special need.",8 7 Rather, the court first determines the extent of the
privacy expectations of the individual and evaluates the reasonable-
ness of the search under the circumstances.88 The Court then
80. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
81. 531 U.S. at 40-42, 44 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659
n.18 (1979)).
82. 532 U.S. at 82-84 (2001).
83. Id. at 84.
84. See id. at 83-84.
85. In Edmond, the immediate objective of the checkpoint program was to
intercept narcotics. 531 U.S. at 40. Likewise, the Court in Ferguson ruled the
immediate purpose of the screening program to be the use of "threat of arrest
and prosecution in order to force women into treatment." 532 U.S. at 84.
86. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-22 (2001) (applying
the totality of the circumstances test to conclude that warrantless searches of
probationers are lawful within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
87. Id. at 122.
88. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
2357December 2005]
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balances these considerations against the government's interest.89 As
a result of the curtailment of the special needs doctrine in Edmond
and Ferguson, the use of the totality of the circumstances approach
has become more prevalent in Fourth Amendment analysis.
90
United States v. Knights91 demonstrates how the Court applies
the totality of the circumstances test. There, the Court upheld a
warrantless search in the investigation of a probationer suspected of
engaging in criminal activity.92 The Court relied heavily on Knights'
diminished expectations of privacy as a parolee and his acceptance of
the search provision as a condition of release to support the finding
that the government's interest in law enforcement greatly outweighed
Knights' privacy interest.93 The Court also found Knights' probation
condition "significantly diminished [his] reasonable expectation of
privacy."94  The Court unanimously concluded the government's
imposition of a criminal sanction in the form of probation renders a
probationer subject to reasonable search conditions by virtue of his
diminished liberty rights.
95
The Court's application of the totality of the circumstances test
in Knights illustrates the limiting effect of Edmond and Ferguson:
searches under a special needs rubric demand "some underlying
motivation apart from the government's general interest in law
enforcement." 96 Although the Court in Griffin found a special need
in the effective administration of the parole system, it left open the
banc) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977)).
89. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-21.
90. Courts have applied this traditional balancing approach in determining
the reasonableness of a search where a warrant was not obtained. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hunter, 291 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that
under the totality of the circumstances the police officer'p stop and frisk search
of defendant, supported by reasonable suspicion, was justified); see also
United States v. Patterson, 340 F.3d 368, 371-72 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the officer's search was not
justified where he did not have reasonable suspicion); Dowdy, supra note 70,
at 1050, 1064-68 (suggesting that the special needs doctrine is in growing
disfavor by the Court and was greatly weakened by the Ferguson majority).
91. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
92. Id. at 118-22.
93. See id. at 119-120.
94. Id. at 120.
95. See id. at 119.
96. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 828 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc).
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possibility that "any search of a probationer's home by a probation• , , ,,97
officer is lawful when there are 'reasonable grounds' ... . The
Knights Court used this opportunity to find a constitutionally valid
search outside the special needs framework by applying the totality
of the circumstances test.98 Consequently, although the actual search
in Knights bore close resemblance to that in Griffin, a narrowed
doctrine precluded the Court from convincingly finding a special
need disconnected from law enforcement purposes.
99
V. THE NINTH CIRcuIT's EN BANC
DECISION IN UNITED STA TES v. KINCADE
A. The Ninth Circuit Plurality Balances
the Interests in a Totality of the Circumstances Analysis
The Ninth Circuit plurality used the totality of the circumstances
analysis as the runway by which to depart from the reasonable
suspicion requirement. 100 The Ninth Circuit cited the Knights Court,
which declined to "decide whether the probation condition so
diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights' reasonable
expectation of privacy.., that a search by a law enforcement officer
without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment."''1 1 Seeing
this narrow window of opportunity, the Kincade en banc plurality
rationalized the reasonableness of a suspicionless search regime
entangled with law enforcement objectives. 10 2  First, the court
evaluated Kincade's expectation of privacy as a parolee.'0 3 Second,
it determined the level of invasiveness the DNA search entailed.' 4
Finally, the court balanced these two concerns against the
government interest and concluded that because of the lessened
privacy expectation and non-invasiveness of the search, the govern-
ment interest in mandating DNA profiling of parolees was
97. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987).
98. See 534 U.S. at 118.
99. See id. at 119-20.
100. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 831-32.
101. Id. at 830 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 n.6).
102. Id. at 832-33.
103. Id. at 833-36.
104. Id. at 836-38.
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constitutional. 10
5
1. Parolees' purported lessened privacy interest
and the unintrusive nature of the search
Relying on Knights and other cases, the court stated that severe
constrictions on conditional releasees' privacy expectations
differentiate them from the law-abiding citizenry:
0 6
We believe that such a severe and fundamental disruption in
the relationship between the offender and society, along
with the government's concomitantly greater interest in
closely monitoring and supervising conditional releasees, is
in turn sufficient to sustain suspicionless searches of his
person and property even in the absence of some non-law
enforcement "special need"--at least where such searches
meet the Fourth Amendment touchstone of reasonableness
as gauged by the totality of the circumstances.1
0 7
Thus, the court found that parolees have a drastically reduced
expectation of privacy.' 0 8 The court further pointed out that judicial
relief was available where a given search cannot satisfy the totality
of the circumstances test.10 9 In relying on Judge Trott's afore-
mentioned characterization of conditional releasees in Crawford, the
court established the threshold of reasonableness-a search is subject
to remedy and redress if it "shock[s] the conscience of our
community's sense of decency and fairness, or [is] so brutal and
offensive that it does not comport with traditional ideas of fair play
and decency... ."110
Next, the court addressed the significance of DNA extraction as
a privacy issue."' 1 The plurality cited case law to portray blood
extraction' 2 as an unintrusive imposition on bodily integrity.'
13
105. Id. at 838-39.
106. Id. at 834-35 (citing United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1071
(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Trott, J., concurring)).
107. Id. at 835.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 835 n.29 (citing Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1072).
111. Id. at 836.
112. Although the focus is on blood extraction, the term "DNA sample" also
includes "tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample of an individual on which a
DNA analysis can be carried out." 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(c)(1) (2000).
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"[T]he intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant, since
such tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical
examinations....",,114 The plurality went further in portraying the
non-offensiveness of the DNA extraction process by comparing it to
court-sanctioned "body cavity searches of inmates during which
male inmates 'must lift [their] genitals and bend over to spread
[their] buttocks for visual inspection. ..."'115 Additionally, the
court supported the idea that a pinprick performed by a trained
medical professional is characterized as a routine act hardly
extending a couple inches below a person's skin and is therefore
non-invasive. 116 Thus, the court found that blood extractions were
neither offensive nor intrusive as a general matter. "
7
2. Monumental government interests
After analyzing the factors affecting Kincade's privacy rights,
the court continued its balancing analysis by establishing the
"monumental" nature of the government's interest. 18 The court
embraced the idea that the government's "overwhelming interest"
was the reduction of recidivism and increased criminal deterrence. 
119
Drawing upon governmental and societal interests expressed in
Knights and other cases--"rehabilitating convicted offenders and
sheltering society from future victimization"' 12 the court
emphasized that the collection of DNA profiles serves as a way of
monitoring parolees to ensure compliance with the terms of their
release.121 Accordingly, the court held the DNA Act
constitutional.
122
113. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 836 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,
762 (1985) (stating that "society's judgment that blood tests do not constitute
an unduly extensive imposition on an individual's personal privacy and bodily
integrity")).
114. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625
(1989) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966))).
115. Id. at 837 (citing and quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60
n.39 (1979)).
116. See id. at 836-37.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 838-39.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 839.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
A. Reweighing the Balance
The court's application of the totality of the circumstances test
was not only wrong, it weighed the interests incorrectly. Kincade's
expectation of privacy as a parolee was not extinguished as the
plurality's reasoning would suggest. Moreover, blood sampling for
purposes of DNA profiling is more invasive than the plurality is
willing to admit. Finally, the government's interest did not go
beyond normal law enforcement ends, and therefore, cannot be so
"monumental" as to justify a suspicionless search regime.
Kincade maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy despite
being a parolee. It is uncontested that parolees experience some
reduced expectation of privacy. 123 It is unbelievable, however, that
the plurality asserted that parolees retain basic protections only in
cases where the conducted search "shocks" the community
conscience or is "brutal and offensive." 124 The court imported this
standard of protection from Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
analysis 125 and is wholly unnecessary if the standard in Fourth
Amendment analysis is reasonableness. By relegating reasonable-
ness to a shockingly offensive standard, the plurality has practically
extinguished Kincade's expectation of privacy. Under this analysis,
it would appear that Kincade would only be protected in situations
where the search required a forceful invasion of a body cavity absent
any indication of criminal activity. 1
26
The court's characterization of the intrusion of a blood test as
minimal diverts attention from the true invasions facilitated by the
needle prick, namely the wealth of information potentially present in
the DNA. "In prior cases dealing with the level of intrusion
authorized by the taking of blood samples, courts did not confront a
regime in which the samples were turned into profiles capable of
123. Id. at 868 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 839 n.29.
125. See United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc) (Trott, J., concurring).
126. See Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1968)
(concluding that where law enforcement did not have a warrant or at least a
"plain suggestion" that Huguez had a rectal cavity cache containing drugs, the
painful rectal cavity invasion was brutally intrusive and a violation of
Huguez's Fourth Amendment rights).
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being searched time and time again throughout the course of an
individual's life."' 127 Similar to the plurality, other courts have
attempted to reduce the scope of the intrusion by claiming the DNA
profile is for identification purposes akin to fingerprinting. 128  In
reality, DNA has the potential to reveal information beyond mere
identity, relating to health, race, and gender.129 For example, private
employers and insurance companies could use the DNA databases to
obtain information on an applicant's susceptibility to genetic disease
and discriminate on that basis. 130 Indeed, the U.S. Department of
Labor has recognized improper and discriminatory use of genetic
information as a serious workplace issue.131 Some states authorize
DNA use for medical research, but the statutes do not require
informed consent from the donors prior to conducting the research.1
32
Thus, forcefully mandating the surrender of such personal
information where no reasonable suspicion is present is a far greater
intrusion into privacy rights than the plurality in Kincade is willing
to acknowledge.
The government's arguments supporting the intrusions are not
persuasively compelling. The stated government interests are crime
prevention and encouraging rehabilitation. 133  These interests,
although important, are just everyday needs of general law
enforcement. 134 Moreover, the contention that DNA profiling serves
a role in the exoneration of wrongfully convicted persons is merely a
127. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 867 (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 837 (stating that DNA profiles from patient blood only establishes
the defendant's identity); accord Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2004); Padgett v. Ferrero,
294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (stating the bodily intrusion of
taking a blood sample is not significantly greater than fingerprinting or taking
a photograph).
129. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 842 n.3 (Gould, J., concurring).
130. Andrea de Gorgey, The Advent of DNA Databanks: Implications for
Information Privacy, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 381, 390 (1990).
131. Brief of Amicus Curiae Protection & Advocacy, Inc. at 32, Kincade,
379 F.3d 813 (en banc) (No. 02-50380), available at http://www.epic.org/pri
vacy/kincade/pa amicus.pdf [hereinafter Protection & Advocacy Brief].
132. See Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in
Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L.
REv. 127, 156 (2001).
133. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 838-39.
134. See id. at 853 n.8, 855-56 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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collateral benefit from the potential uses of the database. 135 The
DNA Act was not designed for this purpose.' 36 There are no options
for DNA testing in cases where people seek to prove their innocence,
nor is there funding specifically allocated to allow DNA sampling for
exoneration efforts. 13 7 Thus, the government interest is an ordinary
one outweighed by the privacy interests at stake and the extent of the
intrusion.
B. The Totality of the Circumstances Test Offers an Unprincipled
Approach in Upholding Fourth Amendment Protections
The plurality's totality of the circumstances test, as it applies to
suspicionless searches, deviates from the principled approach
provided by the special needs exception. This balancing test may be
appropriate in highly fact dependent situations where reasonable
suspicion exists, such as in Knights.138 It should not be applied,
however, when evaluating an expansive, suspicionless search
program. Despite the plurality's contention in Kincade that its ana-
lysis is consistent with, and flows from the question left unanswered
in Knights,139 it wanders from the more definitive lines establishing
the bounds of Fourth Amendment privacy protections. Rather than
guarding this line, the court chose to redraw it.
The Kincade plurality's use of the totality of the circumstances
test only balanced two factors: the extent of the intrusion involved
and the government's interest.140 The court was convinced
Kincade's status as a parolee deprived him of almost all expectations
of privacy. 14 1 Based on this privacy analysis, the court eviscerated
Kincade's legitimate interests as a counterbalance to government
interest. 4 2 The disturbing precedent set by the plurality is one that
135. Id. at 869 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 534 U.S. 112 (2001). But see Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the
Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L.
REv. 473, 527-528 (1991) (stating that the Court's case-by-case approach to
Fourth Amendment law fails to establish a reliable, consistently applicable
rule).
139. See supra text accompanying note 101.
140. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 833-39.
141. Id at 833-36.
142. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in
Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REv.
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does not follow from any Supreme Court holding: a reduced
expectation of privacy is sufficient to render the individualized
suspicion requirement inapplicable when a suspicionless search
enacted by the government fulfills a law enforcement end.1
43
C. The Special Needs Doctrine Was the Appropriate Test to Apply
Unlike the totality of the circumstances test where the level of
suspicion merely serves as a backdrop in the analysis, the special
needs test to the DNA Act assumes a level of privacy expectation
retained by parolees that protects them from suspicionless searches.
"Never once in over two hundred years of history has the [United
States] Supreme Court approved of a suspicionless search designed
to produce ordinary evidence of criminal wrongdoing for use by the
police."' 144 The plurality applied an inappropriate test without
convincing justification when it liberally extended the analysis
applied in Knights, where reasonable suspicion existed. The Kincade
plurality neglected to consider the fact that the search regime of the
DNA Act lacks a requirement of reasonable suspicion. To the
contrary, the parolee's interest in privacy and protection from
egregious bodily intrusion is built into the special needs test.
145
Therefore, the special needs test was the proper test to apply.
The dissent appropriately began its inquiry by acknowledging
that "[s]ome level of individualized suspicion, therefore, remains the
sine qua non of cases involving searches undertaken for law
enforcement purposes....",,46 When evaluating the reasonableness
of a suspicionless search, where the immediate objective is to
generate evidence for law enforcement purposes, the search is
unconstitutional. 147
Applying a systematic approach to its special needs analysis, the
dissent appropriately noted that applying the special needs test
triggers the departure from the warrant-and-probable cause
requirement. 148  This includes: (1) identifying the search and
483, 588 (1995).
143. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 864 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 854 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
145. See id. at 863 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 853 n.10 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 855 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 863 n.23 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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characterizing it as programmatic or non-programmatic; (2)
determining the government interest and purpose of the search; and
(3) inquiring whether the search's primary or immediate purpose is
one of law enforcement. 149 These are the factors the government
must address in order to show that a constitutionally valid departure
from the standard warrant-and-probable cause requirement is
appropriate.' 50 Thus, by insisting on the special needs framework,
the dissent assumed the appropriate stance of guarding "the structural
edifices of the Fourth Amendment-[the] barriers [which] often
constitute the only protections against governmental intrusions into
the most intimate details of our lives."'
5'1
Several courts have taken the position that the DNA Act's
primary purposes are divorced from criminal prosecution ends.
These courts have found that the immediate purposes of the DNA
Act include simply completing the CODIS database with DNA
samples, with one of the ultimate purposes being to increase the
accuracy of the criminal justice system. 152 Moreover, Judge Gould,
in his Kincade concurrence, opined that recidivism and deterrence
serve as the underpinnings of the Act.' 53  Despite this clever
maneuvering to pull these ancillary benefits to the forefront, the law
enforcement objective is clear: "one of the underlying concepts
behind CODIS is to create a database of convicted offender profiles
and use it to solve crimes for which there are no suspects."' 154 To say
the immediate purpose of the Act is to complete the CODIS database
149. Id. at 855 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 854-59, 863 n.23 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). But see id. at
829 n.23 wherein the plurality contends:
The problem with [the dissent's] view is that courts look for a special
need apart from law enforcement needs only after the government has
executed some challenged search without first obtaining a warrant
supported by probable cause. The Court's resort to special needs
analysis in such cases is the product of that failure, and it has applied
such analysis even in warrantless search cases where there was
reasonable suspicion, like Griffin [v. Wisconsin] ....
151. Id. at 870 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
152. See United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 318 (D. Del.
2003); accord United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1148 n.4,
1148-49, 1157, 1167-68 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
153. 379 F.3d at 840 (Gould, J., concurring).
154. H.R. REP. No. 106-900, pt. 1, at 27 (2000) (agency view of the
Department of Justice).
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utters an incomplete sentence. The immediate purpose of the Act is
to "permit the construction of a national database aimed at solving
past and future crimes,"'155 which is a law enforcement objective.
Applying the special needs test to the DNA Act is
straightforward. The Act is a programmatic, suspicionless search
regime. The government's interest in accurately solving and
prosecuting crimes quickly, with the residual benefit of exonerating
the wrongfully convicted, is undoubtedly a law enforcement
objective. Applying the immediate purpose inquiry provides that the
excessive entanglement of the primary law enforcement objectives
removes DNA searches from the Supreme Court's special needs
exception.
D. Notice and Consent to Search as
Part of Kincade 's Parole Condition
In Knights, the Court found that a search pursuant to Knights'
parole condition, which explicitly stated that he submit to a
warrantless search at anytime, was constitutionally valid.
156
Although Kincade did not agree to a similarly explicit term, the
government could have argued that, as in Knights, Kincade's parole
condition placed him on notice of possible searches by his parole
officer. Moreover, as a parolee, Kincade impliedly consented to the
DNA search. Under the implied consent doctrine, consent to Fourth
Amendment intrusion can be inferred when there is notice of an
impending intrusion and voluntary conduct in light of the notice.
157
Although blood extraction for DNA profiling was not an explicit
parole condition,15 8 the state required Kincade to follow the instru-
155. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 857 n.17 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
156. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114 (2001) (stating that the
probation order included the following condition: that Knights would "' [s]ub-
mit his... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to
search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or rea-
sonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer."').
157. Eustace T. Francis, Combating the Drunk Driver Menace: Conditioning
the Use of Public Highways on Consent to Sobriety Checkpoint Seizures-The
Constitutionality of a Model Consent Seizure Statute, 59 ALB. L. REV. 599,
646 (1995) (citing McGann v. Northeast Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 8
F.3d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir. 1993)).
158. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 874 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The DNA Act was
not passed until December 19, 2000 and was not incorporated into 18 U.S.C.
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ctions of his parole officer. Because Kincade's parole officer reque-
sted he submit to DNA profiling after experiencing problems with
drug abuse, the government could have argued this request was
within the scope of the terms of his release, and therefore, Kincade
received fair warning of a search relating to his parole supervision.
In order to find a valid consent to a search, thereby waiving
Fourth Amendment protection, the consent must be given voluntarily
and not be the product of official coercion.15 9 Courts glean the
question of voluntariness from the totality of the circumstances,
using the Schneckloth factors as a guide. 160 The court considers
several factors in determining voluntary consent, none of which is
dispositive: (1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status;
(2) the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent of the
defendant's cooperation; (4) the defendant's education and
intelligence; (5) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence
will be found; and (6) the defendant's awareness of the right to
refuse to consent. 16 Proof of knowledge of the right to refuse
consent, however, is not mandatory to show voluntariness. 1
62
Here, Kincade accepted his release from custody and voluntarily
made a choice to accept the burdens associated with his freedom. As
a result, he knew he would be subjected to regular monitoring by his
parole officer. Alternatively, he had a right to reject the imposed
conditions by refusing parole. There is no evidence the state used
coercive procedures. The standard conditions applied to federal
parolees is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4209.163 There is no indication
that Kincade objected to monitoring by the parole officer, nor is there
a suggestion he did not understand the imposed conditions. Whether
Kincade knew he had a right to refuse his parole condition and
remain in prison does not affect whether his consent was voluntary.
Kincade had no belief the state would find any incriminating
§ 4209's "Conditions of Parole" until that date. See DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2729 (2000).
Therefore, Kincade could not have been aware of the DNA requirement at the
time of his release on August 4, 2000. See United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d
1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en banc, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
159. Id. at 228.
160. Id. at 223.
161. United States v. Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 1988).
162. Id. at 234.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (2000) (repealed 1987).
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evidence if his parole officer conducted a search, suggesting consent
to any impending search. Moreover, the DNA Act provided Kincade
with constructive notice of the mandatory DNA profiling of parolees.
Therefore, the government would argue Kincade voluntarily
consented to the provisions of the DNA Act in deciding to get out of
the predicament in which he willingly placed himself ab initio.
164
This analysis, Y )wever, remains constitutionally problematic.
Notice of general accountability to a parole officer is not sufficient in
itself to infer Kincade's consent to an invasive DNA search. The
inference of consent and waiver of Fourth Amendment rights is too
tenuous considering the lack of specific notice to Kincade of blood
extraction for DNA profiling. The terms of his release do not
properly inform Kincade of the basis and scope of the intrusion.
165
There is also a strong argument against the voluntariness of the
consent where the state forced Kincade to decide between two unde-
sirable alternatives: remain in prison or be subjected to an intrusive
DNA search. In this situation, the government is coercing Kincade's
choice with its superior bargaining position while creating the
illusion that Kincade is actually making a bargain. 166  A choice
between freedom with the burden of a suspicionless search condition
versus incarceration does not appear to be a genuinely "un-
constrained choice."' 67  The government further demonstrated its
coerciveness with its position of power as the offeror of the
conditions while forcing Kincade to make the decision as a prisoner
of the federal penal system. Because the state forcefully extracted
Kincade's DNA absent any particular investigation, this weakens the
inference that Kincade would impliedly consent to granting the state
such broad, overreaching authority. As such, if the search was
premised on the implied consent doctrine, it still would not pass
constitutional muster, and thus the search would violate Kincade's
Fourth Amendment rights.
164. See Francis, supra note 157, at 656 (stating that it is paradoxical for
individuals to claim that they were coerced into making a decision when the
choice is compelled by a predicament they placed themselves into in the first
place).
165. See id. at 647.
166. See id. at 655.
167. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
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VII. IMPLICATIONS
A. The Provisions of the DNA Act and State Statutes
Authorizing DNA Collection from Parolees Should be Removed
The issue presented in Kincade and the court's subsequent
analysis require that any statute mandating suspicionless collection
of DNA samples from any person not in government custody be
stricken. The DNA Act improperly asserts that parolees and
incarcerated offenders retain the same level of Fourth Amendment
protection. However, this is not the case. Whereas parolees retain a
right against suspicionless searches, the Supreme Court has
recognized that offenders in custody relinquish many significant
privacy rights. 6 In the case of prisoners, "[t]he curtailment of
certain rights is necessary... to accommodate a myriad of 'insti-
tutional needs and objectives' of prison facilities, chief among which
is internal security... [as well as] deterrence and retribution...."169
When these government justifications appear in the DNA profiling
context, they appear to sufficiently justify the intrusion."O These
justifications, however, are not appropriately extended to parolees.
In the context of parolees, the concern is that because parolees
are no longer in custody, they are closer to reintegrating into society.
Although this may be true, "[tihose who have suffered a lawful
168. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984).
169. Id. (citations omitted). It is not exactly presented how DNA profiling
serves the purposes of justice and retribution when the offender is incarcerated.
However, more judicial deference may be warranted if any conceivable
legitimate interest is present.
170. See Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342-43 (N.D. Ga. 2003)
(recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court has not applied the special needs
analysis in defining Fourth Amendment rights of prisoners). Following the
reasoning in Hudson regarding the significant decrease of prisoner privacy
interests, the Padgett court easily concluded the prisoners are constitutionally
required to submit to DNA sampling. Id. at 1344. Moreover, the court
reasoned the felony convictions and placement in prison provided the
necessary justification for the search. Id. at 1343. But see Rise v. Oregon, 59
F.3d 1556, 1568 (9th Cir. 1995) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the
prison inmate exception could not be relied upon because the purpose of the
legislation had nothing to do with prison administration or internal security).
Judge Nelson went on to explain that because the statute allowed collection of
DNA at any point, and it was common practice to collect the sample right
before being released, the government interests were nothing more than
traditional law enforcement. Id.
2370
SUSPICIONLESS DNA SEARCHES
conviction lose an interest in their identity to a degree well-
recognized as sufficient to entitle the government permanently to
maintain a verifiable record of their identity."' 171 The government's
claim that DNA is and would only be used for identification
purposes appears disingenuous. Not only has the scientific
community challenged the meaning of the "junk" DNA stored in
CODIS, one of the major privacy issues is the retention of the
samples themselves. 172  Thus, because of the serious privacy
implications DNA profiling will have on parolees, which extend
beyond their probationary period, the provision of the Act mandating
the collection of their DNA is unconstitutional and should be
removed.
B. The Concerns Resulting From Unconstitutional DNA Profiling
Interestingly, Judge Gould, in his concurrence, realized that the
DNA Act threatens a loss of privacy, the full scope of which cannot
yet be discerned. 173 He emphasized that this consequence would not
be properly resolved in the case before the court because at the time
the government demanded Kincade's blood. Kincade was still part
of the penal system. 174 As such, the DNA was lawfully collected and
served the penalogical purposes of deterrence and rehabilitation.
175
The implications, however, of having sensitive information perma-
nently stored should be examined.
There are concerns for potential misuse and abuse of the DNA
profiles. Although § 14135e of the Act provides a provision for
criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure or use of samples,'
76
171. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837 n.32 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc) (emphasis added).
172. Protection & Advocacy Brief, supra note 131, at 17-18.
173. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 842 (Gould, J., concurring).
174. See id.
175. See id. at 841.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c) (2000) states that a criminal penalty for
impermissible use of DNA is subject to a fine of not more than $250,000. The
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3),
limits the use of DNA information:
(A) to criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identification
purposes; (B) in judicial proceedings, if otherwise admissible pursuant
to applicable statutes or rules; (C) for criminal defense purposes, to a
defendant, who shall have access to samples and analyses performed
in connection with the case in which such defendant is charged; or (D)
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these vague privacy standards do not offer substantive, reassuring
protective guidelines. Rather than calling for measures that protect
DNA information at the front-end by instituting guidelines to prevent
misuse, the statutory provisions only call for punishments after DNA
may have been misappropriated. Preventative measures could
include provisions limiting the use of DNA to specific agencies or
requiring the destruction of the samples after they have been
analyzed. The Act does not provide a means for DNA removal from
the database. 177 As a result of the lack of definitive post-collection
guidelines, there is a growing concern that advances in technology
will expand the use of the DNA for non-forensic purposes. 178 The
expansion beyond the intended purpose is known as a "function
creep" and is seen in the evolving use of Social Security numbers.
179
The use of the numbers, originally limited to Social Security
programs, has segued from governmental to non-governmental
purposes.
180
In addition to the potential abuses of DNA in the United States,
the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, wrote in its
amicus brief in support of Kincade that, almost inevitably, database
insecurity and unauthorized data sharing is subject to exposure and
abuse in a more global context. International law enforcement
agencies such as Interpol have access to CODIS. 1 2 Cooperation
between international agencies is becoming increasingly important to
identify terrorist subjects and other criminal suspects through DNA
if personally identifiable information is removed, for a population
statistics database, for identification research and protocol develop-
ment purposes, or for quality control purposes.
Cross referencing these provisions, it appears they do not adequately establish
requirements that protect DNA information.
177. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 875 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
178. See Protection & Advocacy Brief, supra note 131, at 20-21.
179. Id. at 20.
180. Id. at 20-21 (noting that one of the negative results from this evolution
is "identity theft" by unauthorized individuals).
181. Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Defender Service for the District of
Columbia at 11, Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (en banc) (No. 02-50380), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/kincade/pd-amicus.pdf (illustrating this misuse
where the state of Georgia shared information of law-abiding citizens with a
privately-owned multistate law enforcement databank known as "Matrix").
182. Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center at 15,
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (No. 02-
50380), http://www.epic.org/privacy/genetic/kincade_amicus.pdf.
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data. 8 3  As the U.S. becomes more willing to share DNA
information internationally, there is less opportunity for the U.S. to
control the way foreign agencies use the data. There are ethical
concerns regarding nonconsensual medical research for studying the
propensity to engage in criminal activity and the mining of DNA for
the compilation of personal information unrelated to mere
identification purposes.
With the continued expansion of DNA databases and the
increasing realization that extracted samples contain more
information than previously thought, the precedent the plurality set in
applying the totality of the circumstances test has left little in the way
of reinforcing the structural protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Members of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
support a measure for testing criminal suspects as soon as they are
arrested.18 5  The constitutionality of these measures is not yet
resolved and limits should be drawn. Limitations in the form of a
stringent and consistently applicable test would prevent the
encroachment upon basic Fourth Amendment liberties by what has
been described as "the voracious appetite of law enforcement."'
186
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit en banc court decided that the Fourth
Amendment permits DNA profiling of conditionally released federal
offenders in the absence of individualized suspicion that they have
committed any additional crimes. 187 The court used United States v.
Knights to find reasonableness in a suspicionless DNA search
regime.18 8  Although the touchstone of Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence has been reasonableness, it has always required a minimum
level of suspicion, which the DNA Act does not demand. Unwilling
to recognize the expansive scope of the DNA Act and its impli-
cations, the court's overly narrow perspective on the intrusiveness of
183. See id.
184. See id. at 10-11.
185. Aaron P. Stevens, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA
Databases in America, 79 Thx. L. REv. 921, 949 (2001) (referring to the IACP
Resolution that calls upon law enforcement to support legislation authorizing
DNA profiling of arrestees).
186. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 873 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
187. SeeKincade, 379 F.3d at 816, 839-40.
188. See id. at 827-28, 839.
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the search allows the government to extract and retain personally
sensitive information that does not survive proper constitutional
scrutiny, even in the context of individuals who admittedly maintain
a lesser degree of privacy expectations. The court should have
applied the special needs test to guard and preserve Fourth
Amendment protection. Had it done so, the court would have
properly concluded that the search and the DNA Act as it applies to
parolees violated the Fourth Amendment.
Eighteenth century common law afforded a higher level of
protection to the home for search and seizure purposes. 189 "[T]he
home was the last bastion of unreasonability in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence."' 90  More accurately, the remaining bastion of
unreasonability should be exactly what the Constitution protects,
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons."'191 One's
own possessory interest in his or her body and the vast information
one's DNA may contain should receive appropriate judicial
protection under the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.
Gilbert J Villaflor*
189. See Jonathan T. Skrmetti, The Keys to the Castle: A New Standard for
Warrantless Home Searches in United States v. Knights, 25 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 1201, 1209-10, 1213 (2002).
190. Id. at 1213.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
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